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In October 1964, Harold Wilson, the recently elected 
Labour prime minister, appointed Solly Zuckerman as 
chief scientific adviser to the British government. There 
has been CSA ever since, but the role has changed dras-
tically as the nature of the British state’s scientific and 
technological capacity and its position in the world has 
been transformed. 
In 1964, British national R&D expenditure was 
nearly 3 per cent of GDP—much higher than it is today. 
Scientific advisers, in part, gave independent, external 
advice on this, especially the state-supported R&D in 
which government research scientists and engineers 
often had key executive roles. That advice was often 
critical. The second role for scientific advisers in gov-
ernment was to give advice on matters not directly 
concerned with research as such, nor indeed solely on 
the basis of the results of research. 
Both these modes of advice predate the position of 
CSA by decades. For example, the Advisory Committee 
on Aeronautics and its successors began giving advice 
on particular research programmes in the crucial field 
of aeronautics before the first world war. The history 
of more general advice by scientists is also a very long 
one, but the second world war was an important turn-
ing point. The key idea (which will be told in full for the 
first time in William Thomas’s book Rational Action, to 
be published next year) was that scientists doing ‘opera-
tional research’ could usefully advise military officers 
on military operations and improving the effectiveness 
of weapons. 
This was the sense in which Henry Tizard was scien-
tific adviser to the chief of the air staff, and this was 
the role of the wartime scientific advisers to each of 
the service ministries that ran the army, navy and air 
force. Zuckerman was a junior scientific adviser, first to 
Combined Operations, then to part of the allied air forc-
es. These advisers were not in charge of R&D policy or 
laboratories—other scientists and engineers did that— 
or anything other than a very small staff. 
During the war, many of the key scientific advisers 
were deeply hostile to some research programmes. Many 
felt that a British atomic bomb was not a good idea—the 
war would be over too soon. Large rocket development 
was a particular bugbear for some. 
In fact, many advisers were deeply hostile to the 
greatest of their kind—Frederick Lindemann, professor 
of physics at Oxford. Lindemann was a personal assistant 
to prime minister Winston Churchill and a close adviser 
on all sorts of matters apart from strategy. He was elevat-
ed to the Cabinet in 1941. No other scientific adviser has 
matched him in power, influence or breadth of advice. 
After the war, the distinction between advisers and 
executive scientists remained (though it has escaped 
most students of science policy). In many cases, both 
types of job were occupied by scientific civil servants, as 
the government research corps was then styled. 
The internally recruited scientific advisers, though 
their names are practically unknown to students of 
science policy, were, on balance, much more influ-
ential than the outsiders. The key positions were 
in the Ministry of Defence, which oversaw both the 
service ministries and the Ministry of Supply. At the MoD 
in the 1950s, Frederick Brundrett, a former naval scien-
tist, played a crucial role in obtaining hydrogen bombs 
for Britain. 
In 1960, Solly Zuckerman was appointed chief scien-
tific adviser to the Ministry of Defence. Not since Henry 
Tizard in the 1940s had the post been held by an exter-
nal figure. Zuckerman was not a nuclear scientist, nor 
an aeronautical engineer—indeed he was a formidable 
critic of elements of the key policies of the scientific 
weaponeers. But he lost most of his battles to scientists 
far less well known than him. In 1964, he became CSA to 
the government and soon relinquished the defence role. 
As government CSA he was also a critic, for example, 
of the idea that Britain spent too little on research and 
development. He is a key example of the CSA not as 
propagandist for more research but as a reflective critic 
of the claims of parts of the research community.  
Since then, the role has become a much smaller one 
on the world stage and one more concerned with issues 
in public health, the administration 
of scientific advice, and advocacy 
for the scientific worldview within 
government. 
Whether the status of the CSA has 
risen or fallen since 1964 is a matter 
of debate, but it is a serious mistake 
to equate the extent of state sup-
port for research with the status 
and power of advisers, including 
the CSA. 
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Devil’s advocates 
d a v i d  e g e r t o n   v i e w  f r o m  t h e  t o p
The post of government chief scientific adviser—which turns 50 this month—was 
created as much to criticise policy as to facilitate it, says David Edgerton.
‘Zuckerman is an 
example of the CSA 
not as propagandist 
for more research 
but as a reflective 
critic of the 
claims of parts 
of the research 
community’
David Edgerton’s latest book is England and the 
Aeroplane: Militarism, Modernity and Machines 
(Penguin).
